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Abstract. We expect an increase in the frequency and severity of cyber-
attacks that comes along with the need for efficient security countermea-
sures. The process of attributing a cyber-attack helps to construct effi-
cient and targeted mitigating and preventive security measures. In this
work, we propose an argumentation-based reasoner (ABR) as a proof-
of-concept tool that can help a forensics analyst during the analysis of
forensic evidence and the attribution process. Given the evidence col-
lected from a cyber-attack, our reasoner can assist the analyst during
the investigation process, by helping him/her to analyze the evidence
and identify who performed the attack. Furthermore, it suggests to the
analyst where to focus further analyses by giving hints of the missing ev-
idence or new investigation paths to follow. ABR is the first automatic
reasoner that can combine both technical and social evidence in the
analysis of a cyber-attack, and that can also cope with incomplete and
conflicting information. To illustrate how ABR can assist in the analysis
and attribution of cyber-attacks we have used examples of cyber-attacks
and their analyses as reported in publicly available reports and online
literature. We do not mean to either agree or disagree with the analyses
presented therein or reach attribution conclusions.
1 Introduction
The increase in cyber-attacks we are currently facing [33] is expected to continue,
especially given the exponential increase in the usage of IoT and smart devices,
which drastically increases the attack surface of systems. The increasing depen-
dency users have on these connected devices raises the users’ exposure to cyber-
attacks. The growth in frequency and severity of cyber-attacks comes along with
the increased economic costs associated to the damages caused by such cyber-
attacks [16]. Existing protective and mitigating measures are not sufficient to
cope with the sophistication of current attacks. This brings the need to enforce
efficient preventive and mitigating measures that are attacker-oriented, i.e., coun-
termeasures that are specific to the attacker or group of attackers performing
the attack. Furthermore, discovering who performed an attack and bringing the
perpetrators to justice, can act as a deterrent for future cyber-attacks.
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Attacker-oriented countermeasures require to discover the perpetrator of the
attack or the entity related to it. Attribution is the process of assigning an action
of a cyber-attack to a particular entity/attacker/group of attackers. Currently,
the attribution of cyber-attacks is mainly a manual process, performed by the
forensic analyst, and is strictly related to the knowledge of the analyst, thus, is
easily human biased and error-prone. Attributing cyber-attacks is not trivial, as
attackers often use deceptive and anti-forensics techniques [18], and the analysts
need to analyze an enormous amount of data, filter [23,38] and classify them.
The increasing use of IoT devices aggravates the work of the analysts and makes
the attribution process more expensive, as the analysts might need to physically
access the devices to retrieve their data.
Digital forensics helps during the attribution process, as it collects and ana-
lyzes the evidence left by the attack, but it is not able to deal with conflicting
or incomplete information. It only works with technical evidence, and fails to
consider other aspects such as geopolitical situations and social-cultural contexts
that provide useful leads during an investigation. Digital forensics tools mainly
focus on collecting the evidence, which is then given to the analyst for analysis.
This makes the process often extremely human-intensive, requiring many skilled
analysts to work for weeks or even months [31,45]. The problem is aggravated by
the large proportion of unstructured data, which makes the automated analysis
challenging.
In this work, we propose an automatic reasoner (ABR), based on argumenta-
tion and abductive reasoning that helps the forensic analyst during the evidence
analysis and attribution process. Given the pieces of cyber forensic and social
evidence of a cyber-attack, the proposed reasoner analyzes them and derives
new information that is provided to the analyst. In particular, ABR can answer
queries, such as, who is a possible perpetrator of an attack, who has the motives
to perform it, what are the capabilities needed to perform an attack or what are
the similarities with past attacks. Furthermore, ABR can suggest to the analyst
other paths of investigation, by giving hints on what other pieces of evidence can
be collected to arrive at a conclusion thus, enabling a prioritized evidence col-
lection. Our reasoner is based on our preliminary work [25,24] where we briefly
presented the main intuition behind ABR. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first automatic reasoner that helps with the analysis of cyber-attacks using
both technical and social evidence, and that is able to reason with conflicting
and incomplete knowledge.
The reasoner uses a set of reasoning rules, preferences between them, and
background knowledge. The rules of the reasoner are constructed from the input
provided by the expert user and from the analyses of past attacks. To illus-
trate ABR, we have used in this paper rules extrapolated from the analysis of
well-known cyber-attacks as published in the public literature (e.g., APT1 [27],
Wannacry [32]). In particular, the rules were generalised so that they can be ap-
plied across different attack scenarios. The background knowledge incorporates
typical common knowledge that analysts may use during the analysis process.
In this work, we have used some of the knowledge extracted from the examples,
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as well as other public reports such as [19,7,8]. Our reasoner can assist in the at-
tribution of an attack by using both technical evidence and social considerations
that are represented thanks to the use of a social model [39].
ABR is able to work with incomplete and conflicting evidence. We decided
to base ABR on an argumentation framework, in particular, a preference-based
argumentation framework [22], which permits to reason with conflicting pieces of
evidence by introducing preferences between the applied rules. We use preference-
based argumentation as it is similar to the decision-making process followed by
digital forensics investigators. ABR is constructed using the Gorgias [20] tool,
which uses abductive reasoning [21] combined with preference-based argumen-
tation. The use of abduction allows us to reach conclusions even with incomplete
information, as the missing information is abduced (hypothesized) and then sug-
gested to the analyst as hints of possible further evidence to be collected.
ABR is a proof-of-concept tool that aims to assist the analyst during the
analysis process. Therefore, together with the answer to a query it also provides
the explanation of the reasoning process, applied rules and the information used
to reach that conclusion. Furthermore, ABR gives hints to the analyst for missing
evidence, that, if provided, allows to pursue other investigation paths. ABR is
flexible and adaptable to user requests and changes. The use of ABR helps to
promote best practices and to share lessons learned from past experience as
rules and background knowledge can be constructed with expert input and then
shared and re-used across investigations.
In Section 2 we present the relevant related work. We introduce our argumentation-
based reasoner (ABR) in Section 3. In Section 4 and 5 we present ABR’s main
components, correspondingly its reasoning rules and its background knowledge.
We give an overall evaluation and discussion in Section 6. In Section 7 we con-
clude and present some interesting future research directions.
2 Related Work
Attribution of a cyber-attack is the process of “determining the identity or loca-
tion of an attacker or attackers intermediary” [46]. Tracing the origin of a cyber-
attack is difficult as attackers can easily forge or obscure information sources,
and use anti-forensics tools, to avoid being detected and identified [18]. Digital
forensics plays a significant role in attribution by collecting, examining, analyz-
ing and reporting the evidence [26]. Other techniques created for protecting the
systems are also used to collect forensic data, e.g., traceback techniques [46],
honeypots [4], or other deception techniques [1,2,44].
Digital forensics comes with its own challenges [6], that can mainly be cat-
egorised into: complexity problems as the collected data are in the lowest raw
format and require high resources to analyze them and quantity problems as the
enormous amount of collected data is too large to be analyzed manually [9].
Forensics techniques identify and collect the evidence that is later managed and
analyzed by the forensic analyst. Since often the data are collected from differ-
ent sources and the attackers can plant false evidence to lead the investigator
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off his/her trail, the latter is likely to be in a situation with multiple pieces of
conflicting evidence. Digital forensics techniques can deal with conflicting infor-
mation during the evidence collection phase [5,15], but lack the ability to work
with conflicting pieces of evidence during the analysis and attribution process.
These techniques can collect pieces of evidence [42], but have difficulties reason-
ing with incomplete information, and reaching conclusions without having all the
needed pieces of evidence. Digital forensics only uses technical evidence [45] and
fails to consider other factors such as geopolitical situations and social-cultural
contexts, which could provide useful leads during the investigations.
A theoretical social science model is proposed in [39], called the Q-Model
that describes how the analysts combine technical and social evidence during
the attribution process. In this model, attribution is described as an incremental
process passing from one level of attribution to the other. The Q-Model repre-
sents how the forensic investigators perform the attribution process and partic-
ular attention is placed on the social evidence, where contextual knowledge such
as ongoing conflicts between countries or rivalry between corporations are very
useful in detecting motives of potential culprits.
We decided to use argumentation for our reasoner, as argumentation helps
during the analysis and attribution process because it is transparent and encour-
ages the evaluation of the arguments, by assessing the relative importance of vari-
ous factors when making decisions [35]. Argumentation captures the fact that the
final decision might change if more information is available (i.e., non-monotonic
reasoning [12]), where more information may reveal new arguments that are
in conflict with the original ones and are stronger than them. Non-monotonic
reasoning has previously been proposed to tackle the attribution challenge. For
example, in [34,43] the authors propose the DeLP3E framework to attribute op-
erations of cyber-attacks. This theoretical framework is based on the extension
of Defeasible Logic Programming with probabilistic uncertainty. The DeLP3E
framework does not deal with incomplete evidence, and thus, cannot make as-
sumptions to reach a conclusion and cannot suggest new paths of investigation
or new evidence to be collected. It also lacks in general technical and social com-
mon knowledge, e.g., ongoing conflicts/rivalries between countries/corporations,
information about past attacks, cyber-security capabilities of entities, which can
be very useful in detecting motives, capabilities and potential culprits. DeLP3E
uses as a measure for its conclusion the probabilities of an event being true.
However, this requires the user to provide the probability of being true for each
of the given pieces of evidence. It also does not distinguish the different levels of
reasoning that can be applied to reach certain conclusions.
Despite the advances in using digital forensics or defeasible reasoning in at-
tribution, some shortcomings still remain to be addressed. The most important
one is that none of the current works considers the social aspects of attribution.
The current state of the art does not deal with incomplete evidence, which is an
important aspect of forensic investigations, as usually not all evidence can be col-
lected due to time/resource constraints, and anti-forensics tools used by attackers
can hide some of the evidence. We believe, our reasoner is the first attempt to
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use a social model to categorize evidence and rules in an argumentation-based
framework, which leads to a more accurate and explainable attribution that
helps the investigator during the analysis process also in case of conflicting and
incomplete evidence.
3 Argumentation-Based Reasoner for Attribution
Let us now introduce our argumentation-based reasoner (ABR) that is based
on a preference-based argumentation framework. ABR is composed of two main
components the reasoning rules, and the background knowledge, see Figure 1.
Given the evidence presented in input, ABR analyzes it and attempts to answer
queries about the possible perpetrators of the attack, or provides suggestions
for further pieces of evidence needed to reach a conclusion or perform a more
precise or a different analysis. The reasoning rules used by ABR were extracted1
from public reports about past cyber-attacks and formalized in the argumen-
tation framework2. In actual use, rules could be specified by expert users or
extracted automatically from different analyses and then reviewed by expert an-
alysts. Rules are divided into three layers: technical, operational and strategic
layer, following the social model structure proposed in [39]. In this paper, we
have used background knowledge based on the information extracted from on-
line analyses of past cyber-attacks and relevant information for these attacks.
ABR takes as input from the user the pieces of evidence (technical and social
evidence) relevant to the current investigation and then analyzes them by using
the reasoning rules and the background knowledge. It gives as result to the user
answers to the user’s queries, e.g., if a given entity is a possible culprit of the
attack, together with an explanation on how the conclusion was reached, hints
about what other pieces of evidence the user can provide to perform a more
precise or a new analysis.
3.1 Argumentation Framework for Attribution
We base our reasoner on a preference-based argumentation framework [22,20], as
it permits the user to take decisions while working with conflicting evidence, and
it naturally encodes the different reasoning layers with its preference relations
between rules. The used framework best simulates the analysis and attribution
process made by an investigator, who needs to use different reasoning rules that
work with technical and social aspects of the attack, have exceptions, and can
derive conflicting conclusions.
Our framework allows the investigator to work with conflicting evidence and
reasoning rules that derive conflicting conclusions, by introducing preferences
between them. The introduced preferences can be considered as exceptions to
1 Currently the extraction of the rules is done manually by analyzing various reports
and articles about the analysis and attribution of past cyber-attacks.
2 The rules extracted have not been evaluated for correctness and might not be com-
plete i.e., they might not capture the complexity of the situations encountered.
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other rules, or preferences that are context dependent. The use of argumentation
permits to provide an explanation of the given results. Let us briefly introduce
the used framework.
An argumentation theory is a pair (T ,P) of argument rules T and preference
rules P. The argument rules T are a set of labeled formulas of the form:
rulei : L← L1, . . . , Ln
where L,L1, . . . , Ln are positive or negative ground literals, and rulei is the label
denoting the rule name. In the above argument rule, L denotes the conclusion
of the argument rule and L1, . . . , Ln denote its premises. The premise of an
argument rule is the set of conditions required for the conclusion to be true. In
our framework, the argument rules are the reasoning rules used by ABR. Let us
show below a reasoning rule that is part of ABR:
str1 : isCulprit(C,Att)← ClaimResp(C,Att)
where the rule name is the label of the rule, in this case str1; the head is
the second argument and represents the conclusion of the rule, in this case
isCulprit(C,Att); the body predicates are the literals following the head, and
represent the premises of the rule, in this case ClaimResp(C,Att).
The preference rules P are a set of labelled formulas of the form:
pi : rule1 > rule2
where pi is the label denoting the rule name, the head of the rule is rule1 > rule2,
and rule1, rule2 are labels of rules defined in T , and > refers to an irreflexive,
transitive and antisymmetric higher priority relation between rules. The above
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rule means that rule1 has higher priority than rule2, or better rule1 is preferred
over rule2. The preference rules, also called priority rules are true always or in
certain conditions or contexts. We show below a priority rule, p1, denoting that
rule str2 is preferred over rule str1.
p1 : str2 > str1
We have priority rules between rules that are in conflict with each other or
better that derive conflicting conclusions. Preference-based argumentation allows
the investigator to handle non-monotonic reasoning [12] in attribution, where
the introduction of new evidence might change the result of the attribution
(due to conflicting arguments) and the investigator’s confidence in the results.
Argumentation is particularly useful as it permits to represent the reasoning
rules in an intuitive and simple way.
Let us introduce the following rule that is part of ABR:
str2 : ¬isCulprit(X,Att)← ¬hasCap(X,Att).
Rule str2 describes that entity X is not the possible culprit for the attack Att,
because it does not have the capabilities for performing it. Rule str1 and str2 are
in conflict with each other because when both preconditions are met, they derive
conflicting conclusions. Given the above preference rule p1, rule str2 is preferred
over rule str1. Thus, in case both preconditions for str1 and str2 are given, we
take into consideration only the conclusion from str2 , ¬isCulprit(C,Att).
The inputs of ABR are pieces of evidence that are used together with the
background knowledge by the reasoning rules to derive new information. The
reasoning rules and the preferences used in this paper were extracted from real
cyber-attacks analyses and attribution taken from online public reports, such
as [27,32].
ABR is the first tool that is able to work with incomplete evidence. It provides
hints of missing evidence or new investigation paths to the user, thanks to the use
of abductive reasoning [21]. The use of abducible predicates permits to fill the
knowledge gaps in the reasoning, by allowing ABR to perform the analysis and
to reach a conclusion even when there are insufficient pieces of evidence. This
feature is extremely important to the investigator who is provided with new
possible conclusions and new evidence to be collected. To construct ABR we use
the Gorgias [20] tool, which is a preference-based argumentation reasoning tool
that uses abduction.
Let us now introduce the following rule from ABR:
op1 : hasMotive(X,Att)← target(T,Att), industry(T ),
hasEconMot(X,T ),
contextOfAtt(econ,Att),
specificTarget(Att).
which states that X has the motives to perform attack Att, when it has econom-
ical motives against the target T of Att, where T is an industrial company, the
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context of Att was economical (econ), and Att had a specific target. ABR treats
specificTarget as an abducible predicate. For every abducible predicate we have
the rules that derive the predicate or its negation. For the specificTarget ab-
ducible we can prove that it is not true by using the following rule.
op2 : ¬specificTarget(Att)← target(T1, Att),
target(T2, Att), T1 6= T2.
In case, we are not able to derive ¬specificTarget(Att), then we can abduce
(hypothesize) that specificTarget(Att) is true, and we can use this result to
derive hasMotive(X,Att), in case we have the rest of the preconditions.
3.2 Technical and Social Attribution
The main goal of the ABR reasoner is to assist the forensic analyst during
the evidence analysis. Given the pieces of evidence of an attack, the reasoner
analyzes the evidence and derives new information, if possible attributes this
attack to one or different possible entities, or provides suggestions on other
pieces of evidence that the user can provide to better analyze and attribute the
attack. To perform the attribution process, ABR also needs to work with non-
technical evidence, usually called social evidence. To deal with these aspects, we
have used a social model for attribution, called the Q-Model [39]. This model
represents how the investigators perform the attribution process of cyber-attacks.
Following the Q-Model, we categorize the evidence and the reasoning rules into
three layers: technical, operational and strategic. The combination of information
in these layers permits the attribution of a cyber-attack, as it aims to emulate
the investigator’s attribution process. Depending on the layer a rule/evidence is
part of, we call it a technical, operational, or strategic rule/evidence and denote
its name starting correspondingly with t, op, or str.
The technical layer is composed of rules that deal with pieces of evidence
obtained from digital forensics processes, related to technical evidence of the
attack, and how it was carried out, e.g., the IP address from which the attack
was originated, time of the attack, logs, type of attack, code used. Let us give
below an example of a technical layer reasoning rule that is part of ABR:
t1 : reqHighRes(Att)← usesZeroDay(Att).
Rule t1 denotes that if the attack Att uses zero-day vulnerabilities, usesZeroDay(Att),
then this attack requires a lot of resources, reqHighRes(Att).
The operational layer is composed of rules that deal with non-technical pieces
of evidence that relate to the social aspects where the attack took place, e.g.,
the motives of the attack, the needed capabilities to perform it, the political or
economical context where it took place. Let us give below an operational layer
reasoning rule that is part of ABR:
op3 : hasCap(X,Att)← reqHighRes(Att),
hasResources(X).
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Rule op3 denotes that if Att requires a large amount of resources, and an entity X
has (large amounts of) resources, hasResources(X), then X has the capability
to carry out the attack, hasCap(X,Att).
The strategic layer is composed of rules that deal with who performed the
attack, or who is obtaining advantage from it. Let us give below a strategic layer
reasoning rule that is part of ABR:
str3 : isCulprit(X,Att)← hasMotive(X,Att),
hasCap(X,Att).
Rule str3 denotes that if X has both the capability, hasCap(X,Att), and the
motive, hasMotive(X,Att), to carry out the attack Att, then X is a possible
culprit of the attack, isCulprit(X,Att).
As shown in Figure 1, the operational rules use information derived from
the technical layer, and the strategic rules use information derived from the
technical and operational layers. All three layers use the evidence given by the
user and the background knowledge. This categorization of the evidence and
rules in three layers, following from the Q-Model, aims to emulate the forensic
investigator’s analysis during the attribution process, where s/he moves from the
technical layer, to the operational, and finally to the strategic one, by using the
conclusions from the previous layers. Furthermore, this categorization improves
ABR’s usability, given the investigator’s familiarity with these three layers.
4 ABR’s Reasoning Rules
To illustrate the use of ABR we have extracted around 200 reasoning rules
from the analyses of different cyber-attacks reported in the public literature
(e.g., APT1 [27] and Wannacry [32]). These rules have then been translated into
generic argumentation rules to be used within the framework. These reasoning
rules are considered as one of the main components of ABR as they permit to
perform the reasoning behind the analysis and attribution of cyber-attacks. We
briefly present some of these rules in this section.
As described in the previous section, the reasoning rules, also called simply
rules, are divided into three layers: technical, operational and strategic. Let us
give an overview of some of the strategic rules of the reasoner and show how the
rules of the different layers are related to each other. The following rules describe
some of the circumstances in which we can derive that an entity X is a possible
culprit (isCulprit(X,Att)) or not (¬isCulprit(X,Att)) of an attack Att.
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str3 : isCulprit(X,Att)← hasMotive(X,Att),
hasCap(X,Att).
str4 : isCulprit(X,Att)← malwareUsed(M1, Att),
similar(M1,M2),
notBlackMarket(M1),
notBlackMarket(M2),
malwareLinked(M2, X).
str5 : ¬isCulprit(X,Att)← ¬attackOrig(X,Att).
str6 : ¬isCulprit(X,Att)← target(X,Att).
Let us use the strategic rule str3, to show the relations of the reasoning rules be-
tween the different layers. Rule str3 uses the predicates hasMotive(X,Att) and
hasCap(X,Att); where the first is a derived predicate of the operational layer,
indicating that X has motives to perform the attack Att and hasCap(X,Att) is
a derived predicate of the technical and operational layer, indicating that entity
X has the capabilities to perform Att.
The hasMotive predicate can be derived using the rule introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1, represented as below:
op1 : hasMotive(X,Att)← target(T,Att), industry(T ),
hasEconMot(X,T ),
contextOfAtt(econ,Att),
specificTarget(Att).
The above rule says that an entity X has the motives to perform Att, when X has
economical motives to attack a particular entity T , which is an industry, and the
attack was designed to target entity T , and the context of Att was economical.
The predicates used in op1 are: target(T,Att) is an evidence, stating that T is
the target of Att; industry(T ) is a background fact, stating that T is an industry;
hasEconMot(X,T ) is an evidence, stating that entity X benefits economically
from attacking industry T , (for example, if countryC has identified industryY
as a strategic industry, we say that hasEconMot(countryC, industryY ) is true);
specificTarget(Att) is an evidence that is true when Att was constructed to at-
tack a particular target; contextOfAtt(Y,Att) is an evidence stating that: if the
target of an attack was a “normal”3 industry, then the context was economical
(econ), if the target was a “political” industry, then the context was political
(pol).
We introduce below one of the rules that derives the hasCap predicate4.
op3 : hasCap(X,Att)← reqHighRes(Att),
hasResources(X).
3 “Normal” industries are companies that are not closely related to a country’s national
interests. A “political” industry is a company that is closely related to a country’s
national interests, e.g., the defence or energy sector.
4 Numerous factors can be used to determine the capability. However, for the sake
of space, we introduce only one of the possible rules that can derive the capability
(hasCap) predicate.
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Rule op3 states that X has the capability to perform Att, when Att requires high
resources and X has the needed resources. Predicate reqHighRes(Att) can be
derived from the following technical rules:
t2 : reqHighRes(Att)← target(T,Att), highSecurity(T ).
t3 : reqHighRes(Att)← highV olAtt(Att), longDurAtt(Att).
t4 : reqHighRes(Att)← highLevelSkill(Att).
where highSecurity(T ) means that entity T has high security measures in place;
highV olAtt(Att) means that Att has a high volume; longDurAtt(Att) means
that Att was performed over a long duration (few months or even years), and
highLevelSkill means that Att is a complex attack and requires high level skills
to be performed. Rule t2 states that Att requires high resources if its target
has put in place high security measures, rule t3 states that Att requires high
resources if the attack has a high volume and a long duration, and rule t4 states
that Att requires high resources if it requires advanced skills.
ABR’s rules are used to analyze the evidence and to derive new conclusions,
in order to offer new insights to the analyst, as shown in the example below.
Example 1. Let us consider the example of the US bank hack [17], that occurred
in 2012. During this attack, US banks faced denial of service (DoS) attacks,
causing websites of many banks to suffer slowdowns and even be unreachable
for many customers. The banks’ web hosting services were infected by a sophis-
ticated malware called Itsoknoproblembro, (denoted as itsOKnp). Earlier that
year, US government placed economic sanctions against Iran. Some of the pieces
of evidence provided to ABR for this attack (usBHack) are as below:
target(us banks, usBHack).
targetCountry(usa, usBHack).
attackPeriod(usBHack, [2012, 9]).
highLevelSkill(usBHack).
malwareUsed(itsOKnp, usBHack).
imposedSanc(usa, iran, [2012, 2]).
By using rule t4 and the evidence that this attack required a high level of skill,
ABR derives that this attack requires high resources, reqHighRes(usBHack).
Another rule capturing that an entity might have a political motive if it has
been the target of sanctions can be written as follows:
op4 : hasPolMotive(C, T,Date)← imposedSanc(T,C,Date).
Rule op4 would then derive
5 that Iran might have political motives against US
because of the sanctions imposed by US against Iran [17], hasPolMotive(iran, us, [2012, 2]).
2
5 ABR’s derived evidence is derived from the application of the rules to the input
evidence and thus depends on both rules and evidence being correct.
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5 ABR’s Background Knowledge
ABR uses background knowledge comprising non-case-specific information and
divided into general knowledge and domain-specific knowledge. Some of the back-
ground knowledge predicates used in this paper are shown in Table 1. The use of
the background knowledge alleviates the analysts’ work and helps avoid human
errors and bias. It comprises of pieces of information that are used as precon-
ditions by the reasoning rules to answer the users’ queries. ABR’s background
knowledge can be updated and enriched by the user. Note that reaching meaning-
ful conclusions through the application of the rules to the background knowledge
relies on the correctness of the background knowledge given.
Predicate example Explanation
industry(infocomm) Type predicate for industries
polIndustry(military) Political industries
norIndustry(infocomm) Non political industries
country(united states) Type predicate for countries
cybersuperpower(united states) List of cyber superpowers
gci tier(afghanistan,initiating)
gci tier(poland, maturing)
gci tier(russian federation,leading)
Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI)
firstLanguage(english, united states) First language used in the country
goodRelation(united states, australia) Good relations between countries
poorRelation(united states, north korea) Poor relations between countries
prominentGroup(fancyBear) Prominent hacker groups
groupOrigin(fancyBear, russian federation) Country of origin of a group
pastTargets(fancyBear, [france,...,poland]) Past targets of a hacker group
malwareLinked(trojanMiniduke,cozyBear) Past attribution of malware
malwareUsedInAttack(flame, flameattack)
ccServer(gowin7, flame) C&C servers of malware
domainRegisteredDetails(gowin7,
adolph dybevek, prinsen gate 6)
Dom. registration details of C&C servers
Table 1. Some of ABR’s background knowledge, divided into: general knowledge (yel-
low) and domain-specific knowledge (orange)
5.1 General Knowledge
The general knowledge consists of information about countries characteristics, in-
ternational relations between nations, and classification of the types of industry.
This information is used together with the given pieces of evidence, to perform
the analysis. Below we illustrate how these predicates are used by ABR’s rules.
Language indicators in malware can provide useful clues regarding the pos-
sible origin of attacks. We use two language artifacts: default system language
settings, sysLang, and language used in code, langInCode. We present below
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two rules of ABR, t5 and t6, that use the language evidence to derive the possible
origin of the attack attackPOrig, when the country’s first language firstLang
matches the one found in the system/code.
t5 : attackPOrig(X,Att)← sysLang(L,Att),
firstLang(L,X).
t6 : attackPOrig(X,Att)← langInCode(L,Att),
firstLang(L,X).
The cyber capability of a nation is another interesting information as it limits
the type of attacks that an entity can carry out. We have used the Global
Cybersecurity Index (GCI) Group [19] and the cyber capabilities of countries in
cyberwar [7] as sources for this information. There are three GCI groups: leading,
maturing and initiating, from where we classify the countries according to their
capabilities. Furthermore, based on the cyber capabilities in cyberwar [7] we
identify some countries as cyber “superpower”. We show below three of ABR’s
rules that use the countries’ cyber capability.
t7 : hasResources(X)← gci tier(X, leading).
t8 : hasResources(X)← cybersuperpower(X).
t9 : hasNoResources(X)← gci tier(X, initiating).
A country hasResources if it is in the ‘leading’ GCI group or is a cyber “super-
power”. Countries in the ‘initiating’ GCI group are considered as hasNoResources.
Example 2. Let us continue with the usBHack introduced in Example 1. In
the background knowledge, we have that Iran is a cyber “superpower”6. Thus,
using rule t8 ABR derives that Iran has the resources to carry out sophisticated
attacks, hasResources(iran). Similarly the application of the operational rule
op3 derives that Iran has the capabilities
7 to perform the US bank hack, as shown
below.
op3 : hasCap(iran, usBHack)← reqHighRes(usBHack),
hasResources(iran).
2
Good international relations between two countries can indicate that a state-
sponsored attack is unlikely. We encoded this information in ABR by creating
a list of countries that have good relations with each other (goodRelation) and
a list of countries that may have poor relations with each other (poorRelation)
according to [47,8]. This information can then be used to narrow down the
6 Iran is mentioned as a “notable player” in [7]. Thus, we identify it as a cyber “su-
perpower”.
7 Note that we have a list of countries that have the resources to perform the attack,
given their cyber capabilities. Rule op3 is applied to all these countries. For the sake
of simplicity, we only show the entities that are of interest to the discussed example.
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countries that might have or not a motive to carry out an attack, as shown by
the following rule.
op5 : ¬hasMotive(C,Att)← targetC(T,Att), country(T ),
country(C), goodRelation(C, T ).
Rule op5 derives that country C does not have any motive to perform Att,
as it has good relations with T that is the country that Att has as target,
(targetC(T,Att)).
5.2 Domain-Specific Knowledge
Domain-specific knowledge consists of information about prominent groups of at-
tackers and past attacks. These facts are primarily used in the strategic and tech-
nical layers. We encoded information on prominent APT groups taken from [14,29],
where for each group we have their: name or ID; country of origin; countries/or-
ganisations targeted by the group in the past; malware or pieces of malicious
software (suspected or confirmed) linked to the group, as well as relations of
this group with other entities (e.g., governments). We assume these groups have
the capabilities of conducting long term and significant attacks. Thus, we derive
that an entity X has the capabilities to perform an attack, if X is a prominent
group of attackers, as shown by the rule below op6.
op6 : hasCap(X,Att)← prominentGroup(X).
Another important part of the domain-specific knowledge is the similarity
with past attacks. For example, similarity to an APT-linked malware may in-
dicate that the same APT group may be responsible. This is presented in rule
str4.
str4 : isCulprit(X,A1)← malwareUsed(M1, A1),
similar(M1,M2),
malwareLinked(M2, X),
notBlackMarket(M1),
notBlackMarket(M2).
In rule str4, we derive that the attacker of Att is most likely entity X, because the
malware used is similar to another malware linked to X, and both malware codes
were not found on the black market (notBlackMarket)8. We use the predicate
similar(M1,M2) to denote that two malwares are similar to each other. In
the rules below we define that M1 and M2 are similar if they use a similar
code obfuscation (similarCodeObf) mechanism, or they share code, or M1 is
derived by modifying M2, or they have similar command and communication
(C&C) servers9, where the similarity of C&C servers of two different malwares
8 Currently, ABR is not able to derive the evidence notBlackMarket. This evidence
is either provided by the user or given in the background knowledge.
9 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we introduce only a subset of ABR’s rules
that identify similarities between malwares or malicious software.
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can be derived by using other ABR’s technical rules.
t10 : similar(M1,M2)← similarCodeObf(M1,M2).
t11 : similar(M1,M2)← sharedCode(M1,M2).
t12 : similar(M1,M2)← modifiedFrom(M1,M2).
t13 : similar(M1,M2)← similarCCServer(M1,M2).
6 Evaluation and Discussion
ABR aims to be a flexible tool designed to be part of an iterative process, where
the user can add other pieces of evidence, rules or preferences after evaluating the
answers produced by the tool. ABR’s input is given manually by the analyst,
or could be collected, in part, automatically through an automatic extraction
process by using digital forensics tools.
6.1 Evaluation
We have tested ABR’s performance and usability using examples of cyber-
attacks published in the online literature. During the evaluation, ABR used the
reasoning rules correctly to identify possible attackers. The explanations pro-
vided, in the textual and the graphical representations, helped to improve the
usage of ABR as they provided information that was used by the user for the
next iterations. ABR answered the queries requested (e.g., if a country had the
motives or capabilities to perform the attack, or if a particular group of attack-
ers could be related to the attack following the technical evidence of the used
malware) as expected, given the pieces of evidence provided as input. Note that
ABR assumes that the input evidence is correct, and providing inaccurate or
incomplete information may lead to incorrect conclusions.
For every tested example, we ran ABR using a subset of the input evidence.
Depending on the use-case and the provided evidence, ABR was able to reach
some conclusions by abducing (hypothesizing) some of the missing predicates.
ABR gave interesting results when asked to provide suggestions for missing ev-
idence, as it proposed useful missing evidence and also new (not predicted)
investigation paths. When a significant part of the evidence was provided to
ABR, its results coincided with those in the publicly available analyses or the
entity attributed in the publicly available analyses was contained in ABR’s list
of possible culprits, which also contained other possibilities.
Let us now briefly introduce some of the cyber-attacks used to evaluate ABR
and its conclusions. For the sake of space, we decided to show some well-known
attacks where ABR was tested, as they do not need a detailed introduction.
ABR analyzed evidence of the Stuxnet attack [48,30] and derived two dif-
ferent entities as possible culprits: US and Israel. The Stuxnet attack was first
discovered in 2010 at the uranium enrichment plant in Iran. The code used was
complex, using four zero-day vulnerabilities and mainly targeted Iran. ABR ex-
plained the conclusion based on the high resources required to perform such a
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sophisticated attack, and the political conflicts that existed in that period be-
tween Iran and US, and between Iran and Israel. In this case, the social evidence
provided to ABR mainly included the political conflicts between Iran and these
two countries. However, ABR would have listed as possible source of the attacks
any entity for which it could derive a motive and that had the resources to
perform such sophisticated attacks.
ABR analyzed evidence of the Sony Pictures attack [40]. The Sony Pictures
attack represents the 2014 attack when hackers infiltrated Sony’s computers and
stole data from Sony’s servers. A group called “Guardians of Peace” claimed
credit for the attack, but several US government organisations claimed that
the attack was state-sponsored by North Korea [10,11,40]. ABR attributed this
attack to three possible culprits: the attackers group called “Guardians of Peace”
and to two countries, Iran and North Korea. The attribution to Iran came as
a consequence of low diplomatic relations between US and Iran. ABR’s results
were unexpected, with respect to the attribution given in [10,11,40]. In this case
we see that ABR can suggest new possible paths of investigation.
ABR analyzed evidence from the Conficker [41] attack and, using the ev-
idence provided, was not able to reach a result. Some of ABR’s suggestions
were to find entities that operated/worked in Ukraine or that had interest in
Ukraine, as the first version of the attack was constructed to avoid machines
with Ukrainian keyboards [37], thus to avoid a specific country (Ukraine). ABR
suggested also to find evidence about political or economical motivations for
the attack, as the attack was sophisticated and it could either be a nation-state
attack or performed by a cyber-criminal organization.
Example 3. Let us now show ABR’s final steps of the analysis and attribution
of the usBHack. Following from Example 1 and 2, ABR derived the follow-
ing predicates: hasCap (iran, usBHack) and hasPolMotive(iran, us, [2012, 2]).
ABR can now apply the following operational rule:
op7 : hasMotive(C,Att)← targetCountry(T,Att),
attackPeriod(Att,Date1),
hasPolMotive(C, T,Date2),
specificTarget(Att)
dateApplicable(Date1, Date2).
Rule op7 permits ABR to derive that Iran has motives to perform the attack,
as it has political motives. Furthermore, these motives are applicable for the
attack, as they occurred less than 1 year before the attack took place. By ap-
plying rule str3, ABR derives that Iran is a possible culprit for this attack
(isCulprit(iran, usBHack)). This result is in line with the attribution reported
in [28], while it does not match another attribution reported in [36], which at-
tributed the attack to a group of hackers. ABR provides its conclusion to the
analyst together with its derivation tree with all the rules and evidence used.
ABR provides further results of possible culprits, when new information is
provided. For example, when new evidence is provided that a leader of the al-
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Qassam Cyber Fighters hackers group has publicly claimed this attack [36], then
ABR derives that this group is also one of the possible attackers.
2
6.2 Discussion
Together with the answers to the queries, ABR also provides the different ways in
which the result was derived. Furthermore, every result comes with its explana-
tion that is composed of the rules and pieces of evidence used. The explanations
are in the form of text and graphical representation. The given explanations
make ABR’s result and analysis process transparent to the user and provides
her/him further information that can be used for the analysis. ABR does not re-
quire the user to be familiar with the argumentation reasoning framework used
as the user needs only to provide the evidence (in some cases the evidence is
automatically extracted), and to launch the queries. The main goal of ABR is to
help the investigator during the analysis process and provide useful information.
ABR’s results include hypothesized but missing evidence and suggestions
about other investigations paths that could be followed by the analyst. The
missing evidence suggested can be collected by the analyst in a second moment
and given to ABR as part of an iterative process. We decided to provide only
the first list of results of the “missing” pieces of evidence, together with the
conclusions that could be derived from them, to keep ABR’s running time and
complexity polynomial. Hence, ABR does not provide an exhaustive list of all
the possible hypotheses/missing evidence. On the other hand, limiting the sug-
gested evidence to be collected can be beneficial for the analyst, who can focus
his/her attention on particular evidence, instead of spending time and resources
on checking an exhaustive list.
ABR promotes best practice and helps to share lessons learned between an-
alysts, as its reasoning rules can be constructed using the analysts’ reasoning
process and be used by multiple investigators across different events. It also
helps investigators cope with large numbers of rules and large knowledge bases.
The attribution process is mainly human-based, and thus can be easily biased,
e.g., by the resources invested [13]. In some cases, it may be difficult for the
analyst to abandon a path of investigation when substantial resources have been
devoted to it. ABR permits to reduce the human bias through the rigorous
application of rules and by suggesting new paths of investigation.
ABR relies on the reasoning rules with which it has been provided. Thus,
ABR can fail to deal with new evidence that has not been encountered before and
which is not included in the reasoning rules. Furthermore, ABR relies on the rules
being correct and complete. To illustrate its operation we have extracted 200
rules from public reports and analyses of cyber-attacks. However, the rules need
to be validated with expert analysts and the rule base would need to be enriched
with further rules for broader use. To facilitate the extraction and update of
the reasoning rules and the background knowledge, we plan to investigate the
automated extraction of rules and knowledge through the use of NLP techniques
in conjunction with ontologies for cyber-attack investigations.
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As ABR uses in its reasoning information from past attacks and past attri-
butions, it will derive the wrong conclusions if the information is incorrect. In
particular, if a past attribution was incorrect, the error can be propagated to
ABR’s new results. For example, the Sony attack attribution [40] was built on
the (alleged) claim that North Korea was responsible for the assault on South
Korean banks in 2013 [3]. We can avoid this problem, by not using past attri-
bution decisions as part of the knowledge, but it would make the attribution
more difficult or cumbersome as it would require a larger amount of additional
evidence. Furthermore, using results of past attributions is a common practice
adopted by forensic analysts during their analysis and attribution process, as it
permits to identify existing groups of attackers and to use their modus operandi
as an important factor for the attribution.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we proposed a method and proof-of-concept argumentation-based
reasoner (ABR) that aims to help forensic investigators during the analysis and
attribution process of cyber-attacks. Our aim was to demonstrate how such a tool
can be constructed using the proposed argumentation framework. ABR aims to
help attribute cyber-attacks by leveraging both social and technical evidence. It
provides explanations of the given results and hints of new investigation paths.
The use of preference-based argumentation and abductive reasoning permits
ABR to work with conflicting pieces of evidence and to fill the knowledge gaps
that derive from incomplete ones. We introduced ABR’s main components that
are its reasoning rules (that are based on past analyses and expert knowledge),
and its background knowledge. We improve ABR usability by applying the Q-
Model and categorizing the evidence and rules in three layers, thus following a
model familiar to the forensic analysts. Our reasoner emphasises the incremental
and iterative nature of attribution, by making the derivations of the solutions
fully transparent to the user.
In our future work, we plan to increase ABR’s reasoning capabilities by
adding new reasoning rules, and new background knowledge. In this work, we
mainly focused on constructing the ABR reasoner, addressing its usability and
showing its possible use. We leave a careful and possibly semi-automated pop-
ulation of the reasoning rules and background knowledge for future work. In
particular, we plan to use NLP techniques to automatically extract the reason-
ing rules and social evidence used by forensic analysts. Furthermore, we intend
to enhance the expressive power of ABR’s reasoner using ontologies. We also aim
to address its integration with forensic tools and data mining techiniques. We
plan to apply ABR to other cyber-attacks, across a broad range of threats and to
improve its usability using feedback from forensic analysts. Another interesting
future work is to include probabilities for our pieces of evidence and reasoning
rules, in order to provide probabilistic measures for the analysis and attribution
results.
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